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SUMMARY

Communist organizations are enlisted to "propagate friendship" during SSF Month, which scarcely agrees with the frequent avowal of an existing, firm, and unbreakable Sino-Soviet friendship. Peace seems to be shunted aside during the celebrations, as the use of women in production, and possession of a strong modern Army, are two USSR phenomena singled out for emulation. Even the chief USSR entertainers coming to China are from the Red Army.

Peking seems desperately anxious to convince the Chinese of Communist good intentions at Panmunjom. The full draft truce agreement is transmitted, along with emphasis on claims that Americans arbitrarily broke off negotiations and misrepresented the issues. Much attention is devoted to the United Nations, with a suggestion that Vishinsky will present a satisfactory peace proposal if Acheson's perfidy permits. Also, more evidence of sagging front-line morale is apparent. The seldom-mentioned Resist-America, Aid-Korea organization promises greater home production in exhange for assurances that the Chinese Volunteers will continue to fight.

Production difficulties are reported, even goods shortages, in the Northeast, where the Russian program is being pushed, while in other areas the use of inferior goods is admitted. Apparently the USSR-planned production program can succeed only through pressure and compulsion, as Soviet advisers urge confiscation of private enterprise and adoption of a piece-work wage basis.

The push for firmer controls by Russianized Party organs reveals that "judicial reform" means abandonment of legal protection for individuals and minority groups, with substitution of summary judgment and manipulated mob rule. Private businessmen who survived the anticorruption drives seem doomed to final extinction through the reformed judiciary.

Despite claims of autonomous governments for Tibetans, it is revealed that Chinese cadres are learning the Tibetan language so they can remain in control. Also, the reported wholesale conversion of peasants and minority nationalities has not diverted the People's Liberation Army from its direction of Sinkiang farming, and elaborate 1953 plans.

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